Zizek, Hegelian Theology after Lacan, and Philosophical Crisis

Interview by Richard Marshall.

'For philosophy to exist within a corporate academy it takes on a defensive apologetic posture, which it has to defend itself against the measurement of making money within the economy. But this framework of “making money” or “job employability” isn’t something that philosophy can capitulate to; indeed it turns philosophy into a handmaiden of free market economics. Philosophy is more fundamental than economics historically and conceptually. This explains why philosophy departments within the USA have more and more turned to analytic versions and ignored entirely what philosophy calls us to in terms of everyday life, ethics and even what we eat.'

'Levinas’ attempt to foreground ethics as first philosophy abandons the flux of historical materialistic unfolding of dialectical reason and even a slight form of temporary diremptive chaos. It was as if, in the name of clear and certain foundation, philosophy after WWII in France, abandoned the risk of what philosophy calls us to do.'

'So even as the universities celebrate identity politics and the dismantling truth claims a economic war was been waged against professors’ students. The professors in the universities failed to protect the wellbeing of their very students and thus ideas, concepts and truths took a backseat to the economic outlook. As the student is burdened with more debt they are forced to perceive education (philosophy, ideas, the humanities, language) as a means to a job market determined by the 1%.'

'The Enlightenment can be said to be in great fear of life itself–the chaos of elan and unpredictable flashes of passion, desires and even the occasional moments of madness that comprise the very elements without which humans would just be robots. Post-structuralism is a form of celebrating this in-human rationality through its short-circuits and misgivings.'

Creston Davisis the Founder and Director of GCAS and is currently an associate professor of philosophy at the GCAS-Research Institute in Ireland, where he’s also the executive director and president of the Board of Governors and a professor of philosophy at the Alma Mater Europaea. Here he talks about why he thinks Western philosophy is dead, Alain Badiou, Zizek on Hegel, Levinas getting Hegel wrong, Derrida, Lyotard and Deleuze, the theological turn, why philosophy must have a body, Dostoevsky’s ‘Notes From The Underground’ , Lacan, Zizek and post-Lacanian theology and its link with capitalism in crisis.

3:AM: What made you become a philosopher?

Creston Davis: Growing up in a very dangerous environment in which each day was filled with massive and overwhelming drama created in me the need for a certain stabilizing framework. Then, when I was in the Army, certain events played out in a way that caused me to seriously reflect on ethics and meaning. These two episodes in life resulted in me seeking out patterns of meaning on the bases of which my life would make sense of the world and my place in it. No other subject than philosophy gives you the tools that carve out not just meaning structures (language, logic, ideas) but also a way of life. Sociology for example cannot be a “way of life”, but philosophy is a way. I think this is why philosophy within the contemporary academy, is so threatening to the business minded administrators and lawyers.

But my journey into philosophy went by way of theology. What theology gives you, at least in many variants of the subject and its history, is a stable foundation of meaning namely a “God”. It may be wrong, but it gives you a fixed place of meaning. I think folks whose lives are filled with distabelizations desire what theology delivers. This is what Freud called an “infantile neurosis”--a certain anxiety about life in general, which is addressed by seeking the security-blanket of a “father” or a protector in the face of threatening chaos. Theology delivers the “goods” in terms of neurosis, as Max Weber famously wrote, “The arms of the church are opened wide.” because the church serves a function of stability within the context of the destabilization of meaning.

So for me, like for many others, theology stabilized my personal need for a meaning system into which my own story made sense. When I was a student at Oxford in the mid 90s I was obsessed with proving God’s existence, which is why Richard Swineburne was my advisor who argued that it’s more rational to believe in God than not.

And yet, life unfolds in its own sometimes unpredictable ways. And for me about 10 years ago, the questions that theology attempted to resolve (or had an answer for) increasingly became less and less satisfactory. The idea, for instance, of a God that controlled all meaning became for me insufferable as if language was fixed once and for all. I certainly understand how theology and Christianity is an answer to people’s longings especially in our contemporary times in which the volatility of the economy, terrorism, the threat of the foreigner strikes fear in the hearts of many, however dangerous and contrived these ideological narratives are . But just look at how Christianity in general in the USA is being deployed ideologically and even in a register of racism and sexism. In this sense, the conceptual solutions that Christian theology delivers and capitalizes on becomes a bulwark for racism, economic inequality and war. And to me, this is unacceptable and even more dangerous.

So my way from theology to philosophy went by way of ideological critique. It’s not to say that philosophy is beyond the reach of ideology--it certainly is not--but Christianity and religion in general are, in many ways, very dangerous and helps bolster the resurgences of a nationalism found in Europe in the 20s and 30s and, now in the USA.

This is why Slavoj Zizek was so important, at least during my PhD studies because his engagement with Christian theology contained within it an acute awareness of ideology. In this way, our reading of certain forms of Christian theology moved me into a radical materialist theology which has now matured into a materialist philosophy as I’ve left behind theology almost entirely over the past 10 years. What’s interesting for me is how human beings can figure out a way of surviving our own destructive habits that are nearly suicidal when examined from an historical analysis. This is why for me, philosophy as a way of life is the most honest way to live--a way committed to the survival and even flourishment of life together on planet earth.

And this is why too, when you take philosophy as a way of life, I just couldn’t remain in good faith in the position of an Associate Professor in the academy today, which is very dangerous and even toxic for students and faculty notwithstanding philosophy itself. Committing oneself to philosophy meant that I needed to start a different university model, which is why I started the Global Center for Advanced Studies(GCAS)  back in 2013 and GCAS College Dublinin which the act of learning becomes an emancipatory act not tethered to putting my students into debt.

3:AM: You’ve argued that western philosophy is a dead end. You agree with Alain Badiou that there are three different orientations to contemporary philosophy – the heremeneutical philosophy of Heidegger and Gadamer, the analytic philosophy of Wittgenstein and Carnap and postmodern philosophy of Derrida and Lyotard and that none of them are useful. Can you explain what you take to be Badiou’s take on these three orientations and why he rejects them?

CD: Alain has been such an inspiration to me personally and philosophically. Yes, I think that within the contemporary academy, whose ethos has been taken over by a corporate outlook since the mid 80s, is dead. For philosophy to exist within a corporate academy it takes on a defensive apologetic posture, which it has to defend itself against the measurement of making money within the economy. But this framework of “making money” or “job employability” isn’t something that philosophy can capitulate to; indeed it turns philosophy into a handmaiden of free market economics. Philosophy is more fundamental than economics historically and conceptually. This explains why philosophy departments within the USA have more and more turned to analytic versions and ignored entirely what philosophy calls us to in terms of everyday life, ethics and even what we eat. Just imagine a Provost at any university reading an application in which a philosopher takes seriously the locus classicus of philosophy itself! To be hired as a philosopher today requires you to teach and research in a way that folds into an economic model, which is why I think most philosophers today in the US are little more than thought managers (propagandists) for the free market.

And this is precisely Badiou’s entire point: contemporary philosophy in the academy surrenders to a different modus operandithan philosophy’s desire-- to live a life of truth and flourishment for all people.

3:AM: In addition to this you find Zizek compelling when he argues that the rejection of a Hegelian dialectical ontology shows the timidity and failure of contemporary philosophy.  What do you take Zizek to be saying here – what is meant by Hegelian dialectical ontology and what difference would such an ontology make?

CD: Unlike Kant, who is still committed to a foundational metaphysics (within the deposited subject as given) Hegel pushed the pillars of a metaphysical architecture to the point of collapsing the entire house itself. What Hegel discovers, and its one of the most exhilarating moments in philosophy to read, is that far from everything being stable, thought is in constant flux within the stitching of unfolding itself. It’s not that everything is chaos--that thought dissolves into a nihilism--but it unfolds through itself in-itself. The difference changes philosophy because it displaces access to a pure Archimedean point from which all things can be know (or totalized) without a body or in Lacanian terms, a subject. Of course Hegel wanted to see where this dialectic would go--in a teleological way toward an absolute access point, but he admits to, in the final analysis, never having that access even if the desire for it bleeds through his words. The upshot here is that philosophy must be a lived experience and can’t remain locked within a contrived architectural space, i.e., the church, the Ivory tower, or even a disembodied mind without a body.  This too is why Deleuze hates Hegel because he sees in him a body, a body in need of life itself.

3:AM: Why do you think Levinas gets Hegel wrong when he sees him as a totalizing thinker and why is this mistake instructive for understanding your approach and your theological turn?

CD: I think Levinas, like many of his contemporaries in the wake of WWII, the tidal wave of fascism, and the Holocaust in Europe, were looking for a foundation on which protective measures (to thought, philosophy, art, to ethnic groups, religion etc.) could be erected. The United Nations and NATO were established at this time seeking international protection through military and diplomatic force. Philosophy and philosophical arguments were no exception to fulfilling a need for protection after WW1 and WW2. This is why, Levinas falls back on a Kantianism and an existentialism (in which the subject is sundered from structure) because Hegel’s dialectics were simply too dramatic and unpredictable and was for this reason, too threatening. The risk in doing philosophy, in living philosophy as a way of life, was superseded for the individual foundation predicated on an a priori of “choice” as absolute and unquestionable.

Levinas’ attempt to foreground ethics as first philosophy abandons the flux of historical materialistic unfolding of dialectical reason and even a slight form of temporary diremptive chaos. It was as if, in the name of clear and certain foundation, philosophy after WWII in France, abandoned the risk of what philosophy calls us to do. Consequently, Levinas’ charge against Hegel as being a totalizer is turned back upon him, only in making this charge he was blind to his own commitment to the subject as absolute, protected not by philosophy but by new international regimes of power. An example of this is easy to point out: if the Other’s face transcends me as subject, then the question is: Who is the other toward which I must submit? And the only way to get access to an answer to this question is one that must rely on a choice because in a field of infinite Others one must make a judgement about who in particular is my Other, and that act of making a judgement presupposes the self can determine who is Other in the first place. So there’s a hidden uncritical philosophical move upon which Levinas’ “ethics as first philosophy” rests and this conceptual apparatus submits to a Kantianism sundered from the unpredictability of life as such. Said differently, a form of mastery and totalization is happening in the blind spot of Levinas’ thought as beautiful as it may be at times.

3:AM: And were Derrida, Lyotard and Deleuze equally guilty of misreading Hegel in a way that took the risk out of philosophy, closing it down and in Badiou’s opinion, finishing it off?

CD: Derrida and I would write to each other and discuss this very point. And like anyone’s work it changes over time. So yes, early Derrida does jump on the anti-Hegelian bandwagon pulled by blinded horses that refused to see the nuances within Hegel himself. This was a trend, which like I said, came in the wake of WWII and its aftermath in European thought. But Catherine Malabou’s PhD thesis, which became the great book, The Future of Hegel, was directed by Derrida. In this extraordinary and courageous manuscript, you find a line of thought that reveals a reversal in early Derrida. You can see this when you read Derrida’s Preface to Catherine’s book.

In terms of Lyotard, as much as his thinking is aesthetic and exhilarating, the grand moves he makes is the deconstruction of our accepted facts of our modernity. The great narrative structures within which history is compartmentalized, Christianity, the Working Class, Truth as Absolute, etc. are themselves deterritorialized, and thus, all epistemic groundwork is left defenseless, without recourse or access to truths with which checks to power can be surmounted.

And what power have we seen rise in the 70s until our very day? It’s an important philosophical questions! That power is economic cut off from any checks. Recall Margaret Thatcher’s ominous dicum: “There is no alternative.” Not even philosophy or truth can hold a candle to the foreboding march to the apocalypse called Wall Street (the four hoursemen). And I cannot help but to mention this very important fact: Even as the humanities and social sciences were falling in love with some French thinkers in the 70’s even up to our time time (Foucault, early Derrida, Lyotard and so forth), and, at the same time, embracing identity politics, all this time what became of the student? In the USA what happened to the student was unforgivable, a uniform disaster: Now the student was burdened, even forced to have to go into debt to receive an education. So even as the universities celebrate identity politics and the dismantling truth claims a economic war was been waged against professors’ students. The professors in the universities failed to protect the wellbeing of their very students and thus ideas, concepts and truths took a backseat to the economic outlook. As the student is burdened with more debt they are forced to perceive education (philosophy, ideas, the humanities, language) as a means to a job market determined by the 1%. The university thus became a job training center even as the professors were celebrating the destruction of conceptual resistance to the vulgar reduction to the economic. And so, while we professors celebrated the incredulity towards truths, the economic war on students via debt, accelerated and denuded any thought-resistance to a dehumanizing economic agenda.

3:AM: To understand your theological turn you argue that we need to understand two basic logical relations – the relation between reason and myth in the epoch of modernity on the one hand and the breakdown of modernity’s coherent thought structure in the wake of post-structuralism on the other. Can you sketch for us what you mean by this and how this helps us understand the new theology?

CD: I spell this out further in the book I’ve been writing with Badiou (for many years), but for now I will just say that the great revolt against theology and myth on the bases of which the Enlightenment came to a coherent dogma, installed a notion of rationality that, for lack of time and space, was devoid of a body--a lived experience. The Enlightenment can be said to be in great fear of life itself--the chaos of elan and unpredictable flashes of passion, desires and even the occasional moments of madness that comprise the very elements without which humans would just be robots. Post-structuralism is a form of celebrating this in-human rationality through its short-circuits and misgivings. But it’s a celebration without spirit(s) an irresponsible thought experiment that still can’t let go of the placebo of Kant’s transcendental subject as an ontological and unquestionable given. And I’m not trying to bring back theology or the middle-ages, on the contrary, I’m just trying to point out that when one structure is overthrown, often that very act installs other perilous forms of thought.

3:AM: So you propose we turn to Christianity if philosophy is to survive.

CD: I did, but only in the sense that Christianity, unlike contemporary post-Enlightenment philosophy, actually requires a body through which a connection to the material world is necessary in its rituals and practices. This is what Christianity (or religion) gets right--because it never forgets the flesh at least in its practice. The question for me is how philosophy can return to the body without needing God as a fixed mantalpiece of meaning. That’s what most interests me.

3:AM: This seems an astonishing claim, a step away from philosophy into theology.

CD: Only in the sense that philosophy can step [walk] at all, and for that you need a body, a materialization of the concepts themselves. As for theology, as mentioned above, I only want to draw from it the need for a body, for rituals that put us as humans into a material relationship with our surrounding world, a world that is being killed off in the name of profits for about 100 people in the world today.

3:AM: Can you sketch for us how this move is supposed to reinvigorate philosophy?

CD: In the end, and I am repeating myself here , philosophy must have a body, bodies. But in university philosophy departments, philosophy only has a bodiless mind that left to itself cannot materially resist the economic war unleashed upon students, humanity and the earth. Philosophy departments have sided with this economic and financial war against humanity and our planet in the name of “philosophy”. And so, all I’m saying is that this is not only not philosophy but a capitulation a certain form of bad-faith to invoke Jean-Paul Sartre (Badiou’s teacher). Philosophy needs a community, not a cult, but a community in which a reinvigoration of philosophy’s desire for truths takes place. This is why Badiou was so important for me in imagining The Global Center for Advanced Studies (GCAS) because it’s a space in which our own internal economy is controlled not by a greedy “for-profit” administrators in university doing the dirty work of wealth men (even in the name of “feminism”, but by researchers (faculty and students) themselves via our decentralized and democratic crypto-economy. This is also why, Jean-Luc Nancy’s idea of community is crucial. Just read his prophetic text, The Disavowed Community. Nancy is on our faculty and has inspired GCAS and has taught for us over the past five years.

But now can you see how within the setting of a university that requires students to go into debt to learn truths only forces them to subsume philosophy to a dog-eat-dog world of economic survival. Philosophy has no chance within the traditional university as defined in today’s terms. This is why GCAS College Dublin is not just debt-free, but welcomes researchers to co-own and co-operate the college when they graduate. It’s the only way that philosophy can maintain an intregrity to itself, which also means that how we think (collectively and individually) must have a body and that means how and what we eat and how we relate to the earth and to each other.

3:AM: You connect your theological thinking with the protagonist from Dostoevsky’s ‘Notes From The Underground’– it’s a theology in the wake of Lacanian psychoanalysis devoid of the ‘big Other’. In fact you say that ‘Only after Lacan can theology mean anything at all.’ So first can you say what features of Lacanian psychoanalysis are being drawn on here, in particular his understanding of trauma and how it connects with traditional theology?

CD: In terms of Dostoevsky--he was the first to write within the literary register that presented the truth of reality’s “crack” that underneath all the institutions (education, religion, the family etc.) what you really have is a social logic that undergirds and reproduces the powerful’s power. And all citizens are suppose to do is accept this logic (mostly unconsciously), but one devoted to truths in the end, just cannot accept this because they see social logic as a scam in which the powerful have become a transcendent master signifier, “God”. This is the meaning of Nietzsche’s pronouncement, “God is Dead… We have killed him” which was taken from Hegel actually. Just read the passage in The Brothers  Karamazov “The Grand Inquisitor” and you can see this “crack” in the symbolic order after which a form of terror forever haunts the world. And this terrorizing haunting is precisely the diremptive moment within Hegel’s dialectical structure. Philosophy should not try to sweep it under the rug of protection and certitude as with Levinas or the positivists. I mean even Wittgenstein, who was one of the contributors of Positivism in the Vienna Circle (just after the world shattered from WWI) finally saw this haunting spector, this “crack” in the field of social reality.

And this is what I mean when I say that Lacan gives theology a certain truth because after the death of the God of rationality, all that remains is terror. The very notion of trauma is the truth of this spector. And again, unless you can embody philosophy, this terror is all that remains within the mind-san-body. The body tarrys with the specter of reality’s terror, it’s “crack” but it’s more than a disembodied mind and so through the flesh a certain divinity alights one that can, although it’s not guaranteed, persist through the negative.

3:AM: Can you say something about how you understand the claims about The Real, expressibility and authenticity we might find not just in Dostoevsky and Lacan but in Camus too?

CD: Are you kidding? Camus’ The Plagueis the negative “real” in pen and ink on paper. And what happens to the city of Oran? It has a body. At first it doesn’t believe in it’s divine powers as a city--a zombie city much like people are when they buy into an economic world-view. But through this death they are resurrected in the form of a body. The best novel in the 20th century.

3:AM: You identify early Lacanian theological thinking as taking much from both Heideggerian approaches and post moderns such as Derrida. How does this square with Badiou’s point that both hermeneutics and post-modernity are part of western philosophy’s corpse?

CD: I’m not sure, really. But in terms of Heidegger, what you see, at the end of the day, is his attempt to return back to the wild spaces of philosophy but he just can’t throw himself into it. His philosophy is like a lover who just can’t finally accept love--the very force that may save and destroy you in the same moment. Later Heidegger enters into the space of poetry, which is, in many ways, so haunting.

3:AM: It seems that the political aspect of this negative theology addresses are all those ideologically distorted and so false pretensions to achieved equality in contemporary bourgeois societies (“fair exchanges between labor and capital in the marketplace”) – truth has become ruined because it’s been staged if you like. Is this a fair comment about what you’re arguing? What is the political act you see as being possible in this rather bleak contemporary circumstance?

CD: For me, it was the creation of GCAS College Dublin devoted to searching for truth and the ability to speak these truths to power from the point of view of a community (a body of bodies).

3:AM: Are you arguing for some gesture of defiance, some negation of negation, what Zizek has called ‘ a pure figure of the undead drive’?

CD: No, for me the negation of negation as an embodied narrative of lived experience is not what Zizek’s philosophy does or doesn’t do, it’s a tarrying with a body however distorted it may be. A body that is a community without a figurehead. Again for me, this is what GCAS is--a global decentered body of bodies in need of each other less we fall prey to total chaos and despair and, at the same time, is absolutely devoid of a triumphalism. It’s what William Desmond calls the in-between that is neither absolute nor nothing.

3:AM: One criticism of Zizek’s Hegelianism is that it still retains the notion that it’s possible, as a Hegelian, to have something fall outside of any mediation. Resistance for Zizek requires that there be unmediated reality, some ‘excess’, some ‘remainder’ that is a product of dialectical mediation that gives wriggle room for gestures of defiance. But I don’t see how Hegelian dialectic can produce anything like this kind of excess or remainder. But without it, doesn’t the whole post-Lacanian theological move fail? No doubt I’m wrong on so many levels here – so how do you respond to this push-back?

CD: I don’t think you’re wrong at all. Your intuition is right. But this is why Hegel left to himself within a mind without a body cannot give you an excess. I mean just think what a body is: billions of years of chaotic striving from stardust. A body is the “excess” of dialectical mediation without a guarantee. A body of bodies, a community thus becomes resistance to and part of chaos when devoted to its divine lifeforce. We still don’t know what a body can do to echo Deleuze.

3:AM: Another feature of what you’ve written about contemporary social reality is that capitalism is in crisis. Do you really think it is in crisis? From where I’m sitting it seems to be doing exactly what Marx said it would do and doesn’t seem like it’s got any reason to end anytime soon. Surely the addition of a couple of billion new people into the mix with the introduction of India and China to the capitalist table just makes it even less likely that it’s in trouble. I guess I’m asking how important it is to the Hegelian/Lacanian Theological approach that you think capitalism is in any sort of terminal trouble?

CD: Capitalism is in crisis precisely because of its success in destroying the planet, the air we breathe, the food we consume. People like and even want power even if that power will destroy them. And until philosophy gets a body of bodies we are all on a suicide mission. The point of being a professor (one who professes) is that even if we’re all going to burn up in the fire-bomb called, “Wall Street” greed, we still must profess. It is our obligation to recruit thinkers to create a different world. This is a theology insofar as our bodies are divine and have the ability to abide in the dangerous waters of being without collapsing into chaos and cannot in itself become an absolute.

3:AM: How do you perceive the connection between your theological position with other contemporary forms of theologies of resistance , both Protestant and catholic and orthodox? Are there congregations being developed or is this stil a largely university based phenomenon?

CD: Wow, I hope what I’ve said already can at least gesture to your question.

3:AM: And how do you see it in  relation to other faiths and other theologies? Is this approach limited to a rather Eurocentric and Christian vision that has little relevance for Islamic, Buddhist and other visions?

CD: My earlier theological and philosophical forays were certainly Eurocentric because they emerged from a body (my body) defined as it was and is by limited and finite social realities. A body cannot be universal and so cannot speak for all things external to its own defined and reproduced symbolic order. And as Frantz Fanon brilliantly points out a Eurocentric epistemic and political colonialism is an unfolding of a hegemonic force that attempts to fold all differences into its structure. We speak from a time and place and yet we grow and learn what our blind spots are, sometimes. I cannot speak as a practicing Muslim or Buddhist but does that mean I should speak at all? In the act of writing and speaking we are condemned to our own limitations, which is actually a liberating reality because we know that we will never arrive at that place of absolute truth. And yet, like a river that keeps flowing, we persist in our thoughts and with our body. The question is: Where is our body going? Do we surrender and give up or is our body itself an act that carries with it a determination to ceaselessly overcome itself through itself? I’ve grown and adjusted my positions, and I still may be wrong, but I strive to grow all the same. And, in that unfolding we are cracked open to growth like the spring and summer. A growth that one day may just give birth to something unforeseen, something divine even.

3:AM: And finally, for the readers here at 3:AM, are there five books other than your own that will take us further into your philosophical world?

CD: In terms of books, I will say that most of what passes off as philosophy books today are products of a determined for-profit education and publishing system that has almost entirely abandoned philosophy full stop. That’s why for me the greatest books in philosophy are not ones written by tenure professors (or worse ones seeking tenure), but those whose reputations are not confirmed or denied by publishing in the first place. When you think about how western philosophy, as a way of life, started in the shadows of the Parthenon in a humble olive grove, outside the polis or city, and how it was seen as threatening to the established regime of power, then I would recommend reading people like Dorothy Day or Luanne McKinnon (whose life is a miracle), or immigrants or ones without homes, on the margins like Frantz Fanon,

and those in prison like Martin Luther King’s, “Letter from Birmingham Jail”,

Nelson Mandela’s autobiography,

Dostoyevsky’s The House of the Dead. Then you put them together with philosophers like Bracha Ettinger, or Jean-Luc Nancy.

Tere Vaden’s book, Heidegger, Zizek & Revolutionis breathtaking

and Dejan Lukic’s Hostage Spaces of the Contemporary Islamicate World: Phantom & Territoriality. I just read the best Deleuze book ever written, Deleuze: Practical Philosophy by Keith Faulkner who writes not to publish or to secure more power in the sold-out academy, he writes because he’s a true philosopher. Also the artists and philosophers in Santiago, Chile in the collective Charco are prophetic, Francisco Gonzalez Castro, Lucy Quezada, Claudia Cofre, Cristian Inostroza, Victor Diaz Sarret and Leonardo Mastromauro. They are the real deal. By contrast, the worse kind of books are the ones written by the “players” you know, the ones trying to write with a indifferent “cool” style who are just egos seeking affirmation from a system of pure greed, corruption, and power.

Oh, and I should say, if anyone is interested in being part of GCAS and GCAS College Dublin they are welcome to join us.

ABOUT THE INTERVIEWER

Richard Marshall is still biding his time.

Buy his new book here or his first book here to keep him biding!

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